PBS Program Focuses On In-Flight Fire Danger
A new program to air on
PBS later this month reports the majority of America's civil
aviation fleet is prone to undetectable and unfightable in-flight
fires. "NOVA Presents: Crash Of Flight 111" further alleges the FAA
and the airline industry have been aware of this problem since 1993
and have, in the case of most recommendations from the Canadian
Transportation Safety Board, failed to act.
NOVA, renowned for its scientific approach to technically
complex stories, takes an inside look at the Canadian investigation
into the watery crash of Swiss Air Flight 111. On September 2,
1998, the crew aboard that New York to Geneva flight reported
smelling smoke in the cockpit approximately 53 minutes into the
flight. The MD-11 was diverted to Halifax, Nova Scotia for a
non-emergency landing. Upon reaching the vicinity of the airport,
the crew decided the aircraft was too high and too heavy for a safe
landing -- especially given the possibility of a fire. So they
turned back out to sea to dump fuel and lose altitude.
That's when things started going horribly wrong for Flight 111.
The CTSB, in a report last year, wrote, "About 13 minutes after the
abnormal odor was first detected, the aircraft's flight data
recorder began to record a rapid succession of aircraft
systems-related failures. The flight crew declared an emergency and
indicated a need to land immediately. About one minute later, radio
communications and secondary radar contact with the aircraft were
lost, and the flight recorders stopped functioning. About five and
one-half minutes later, at 10:31 p.m. Atlantic daylight saving time
(ADT), the aircraft crashed into the ocean about five nautical
miles southwest of Peggy's Cove, Nova Scotia, Canada. The aircraft
was destroyed and there were no survivors."
That was the beginning of a four-and-a-half year long, $39
million investigation into why Flight 111, with all 229 people on
board, disintegrated upon impact with the Atlantic Ocean, just sig
smiles from Peggy's Cove, Nova Scotia.
Investigators knew there had been a fire on board Flight 111.
But they were unable to figure out where or how it started.
NOVA, which is produced by WGBH-TV in Boston (MA), reports the
investigation was all but finished without conclusion when a
Canadian investigator, wrapping up his inconclusive report on the
accident, came across evidence that an electrical arc within the
aircraft's in-flight entertainment network (IFEN) may have sparked
the fire. Eventually, the CTSB concluded, "Reconstruction of the
wreckage indicated that a segment of arced electrical cable
associated with the in-flight entertainment network (IFEN) had been
located in the area where the fire most likely originated. The
Board concluded that the arc on this electrical cable was likely
associated with the fire initiation event. The Board also concluded
that it is likely that one or more additional wires were involved
in the lead arcing event, and that the additional wire or wires
could have been either IFEN or aircraft wires. Therefore, it could
not be concluded that the known arcing event on the IFEN cable
located in the area where the fire most likely originated was by
itself the lead event."
NOVA reports the electrical arc, generating up to 12,000 degrees
(F), ignited the supposedly fireproof mylar insulation surrounding
the interior of the aircraft. The program quotes experts who say,
in aircraft where there's as much as 150 miles of wire on board,
there can be up to 1500 cracks in wiring insulation. Couple that
with the type of condensation typical in the upper compartments of
an aircraft in flight and NOVA's experts suggest the possibility
for a disastrous in-flight fire event are extraordinary.
Isn't that metalized
mylar insulation, variants of which are used in most commercial
aircraft, supposed to be fireproof? It is. But it isn't, reports
NOVA. The program quotes one NTSB official who acknowledged the
flammability of metalized mylar, saying, "I think quite clearly
that there was an oversight, that the testing procedures were not
adequate to reveal the danger from this metalized mylar. And it
took a tragedy such as Swiss Air 111 to highlight that more needed
to be done in this area."
Further, the PBS program reports silicone end caps used in air
circulation ducts -- also certified by the FAA as fireproof --
burned after just four seconds' exposure to an ignition source. The
end caps were flame-tested at the FAA's testing center near
Atlantic City (NJ).
"I think it was a surprise to a number of people," said a CTSB
official, "and not just our team. It certainly was a surprise to
me. I didn't think it would burn like that. I never even thought
about it. I think that most of the other pilots in the world would
be in the same boat."
With the end caps burned away, fresh air was allowed into the
area where the metalized mylar was already burning, lending fresh
fuel to the fire and forcing the flames toward the overhead wiring
compartments above the cockpit.
NOVA reports the flight crew, which originally believed they had
time to dump fuel and descend at a reasonable rate, actually ran
out of time. The fire burned through the cockpit ceiling, filling
the cockpit with fire, smoke and toxic fumes. Before their power
and sensor leads were burned out by the fire, the flight data
recorder indicated a loss of primary instrumentation, forcing the
flight crew to rely on hard-to-read backup instruments and,
finally, trying to fly over water at night, peering through a
smoke-filled windscreen.
"The pilots seat was retracted," said Ken Adams, the ALPA
representative to the Swiss Air 111 investigation. "So we have a
pretty good indication he was not in his seat, which means to me he
was actually up fighting the fire. He was probably using a fire
extinguisher. But if he didn't have any protection from the toxic
gasses, then he was probably disabled."
The Legacy Of Swiss Air 111
The most stinging
allegation uncovered in the NOVA story on Swiss Air 111 is that the
FAA and airlines knew about the flammability of metalized mylar as
far back as 1993, after an MD-11 burned on the taxiway at an
airport in Denmark. The program reports an MD-87 also burned on the
tarmac in China. In fact, NOVA sources allege there were several
aircraft fires in China during the 1990s -- so many, in fact,
that Chinese officials contacted the FAA and suggested "you guys
might have a flammability problem." But NOVA reports there was no
action taken by the FAA until after the Swiss Air tragedy.
The FAA eventually did order airlines to remove the metalized
mylar used by McDonnell-Douglass in its passenger aircraft by this
year. The airlines quickly appealed and were given until next year
to remove and replace the insulation.
The CTSB issued 23 recommendations on improving the fire
detection and protection philosophies among aircraft manufacturers
and air carriers. Replacing the metalized mylar was chief among
them. But they also included adding detection capabilities in
inaccessible parts of aircraft -- the wiring compartments in
particular.
"The TSB believes that the risk to the flying public can be
reduced by re-examining fire-zone designations in order to identify
additional areas of the aircraft that should be equipped with
enhanced smoke/fire detection and suppression systems. Therefore,
the TSB made the following recommendation:
"Appropriate regulatory authorities, together with the aviation
community, review the methodology for establishing designated fire
zones within the pressurized portion of the aircraft, with a view
to providing improved detection and suppression capability. A00-17
(issued 4 December 2000)
"Along with initiating the other elements of a comprehensive
firefighting plan, it is essential that flight crews give
attention, without delay, to preparing the aircraft for a possible
landing at the nearest suitable airport. Therefore, the TSB made
the following recommendation:
"Appropriate regulatory authorities take action to ensure that
industry standards reflect a philosophy that when odor/smoke from
an unknown source appears in an aircraft, the most appropriate
course of action is to prepare to land the aircraft expeditiously.
A00-18 (issued 4 December 2000)
"Aircraft accident data indicate that a self-propagating fire
can develop quickly. Therefore, odor/smoke checklists must be
designed to ensure that the appropriate troubleshooting procedures
are completed quickly and effectively. The TSB is concerned that
this is not the case, and made the following recommendation:
"Appropriate regulatory authorities ensure that emergency
checklist procedures for the condition of odor/smoke of unknown
origin be designed so as to be completed in a time frame that will
minimize the possibility of an in-flight fire being ignited or
sustained. A00-19 (issued 4 December 2000)"
Advice Ignored?
The problem, according to NOVA, is that these safety
recommendations are not being implemented by the FAA, considered
the world's leader in implementing aviation safety protocols.
"We're presently having new airplanes designed -- they're on the
drawing board," said ALPA's Ken Adams. "Boeing has one. Airbus has
what's called the Airbus 380, a 550 passenger airplane. The
regulations haven't changed. They don't have to provide any more
fire detection or fire protection than we had on Swiss Air
111."
"NOVA Presents: Crash Of Flight 111" airs on PBS stations
February 17th at 8:00 p.m. EST.