Gehman: "We've Decided That These Things Are Equal"

NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe was expecting a stinging report from the board investigating the shuttle Columbia's demise. Friday, he got some of what he'd been expecting. The chairman of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, in his final formal briefing, was quoted in the "Washington Post" as saying, in deciding which factor contributed more to the latest shuttle disaster -- the impact of foam or errors in NASA's decision-making -- board members chose not to decide.

"We've now decided that these things are equal," he said.

 That statement from Adm. Harold Gehman (USN, ret.) could mean huge changes ahead for the space agency in the way it handles manned flight. His statement came less than a week after Monday's test of fuel tank insulating foam against the reinforced carbon carbon wing of the shuttle.

Blasting the chunk of foam debris at the wing element at more than 500 mph, engineers at the Southwest Research Institute in San Antonio (TX) ripped a 16- to 17-inch hole in the wing panel. It also broke an adjoining T-seal and caused a spider's web of cracks to form in the rest of the RCC panel.

The Acorn From Which A Tree Grew

Gehman said, even though they didn't have the data to back up the claim, NASA engineers refuted the possibility that the foam strike on Columbia's left wing, shortly after its January 16th launch, could have damaged the spacecraft to the extent that it disintegrated upon re-entry on February 1st. The foam that peeled away from the shuttle's external fuel tank and smacked the left wing was almost twice as big as the next similar foam chunk.

That assumption, said Gehman, led to a series of bad decisions and errors in judgment that included NASA's refusal to heed requests from engineers for spy satellite photos of the left wing. Based on Monday's test in San Antonio, several board members said the damage might well have been spotted by photo reconnaissance while the space plane was still safely in orbit.

Even as Columbia was still circling the planet, NASA managers sent an e-mail to the seven doomed crew members, telling them the foam strike was "not even worth mentioning."

Gehman told reporters Friday, "It tells me how widespread and deeply ingrained this sense was that foam can't hurt an orbiter. The fact that this piece of foam . . . is much, much larger than NASA's previous experience is, of course, important, because it gets into the question of why didn't that alarm the engineers in the program? That's kind of basic to our investigation."

NASA Will Probably Have Someone Looking Over Its Shoulder

 Gehman said the board has no doubt that NASA can address the mechanical issues raised by the death of Columbia and its crew. But in an indication of things to come for the space agency, he indicated the CAIB will likely recommend an independent commission be created to monitor the changes board members think NASA has to make in order to better ensure astronauts' safety. NASA, it would seem, needs a babysitter.

What's Next?

The board has delayed until August the release of its final report. That document will be included in Congressional hearings on the shuttle disaster scheduled to begin after lawmakers return from their summer recess. The "Post" reports witness lists in the Senate and the House will almost undoubtedly contain the names of present and former NASA officials who were called before the CAIB to testify in secret.

FMI: www.caib.gov