FAA Says It Will Determine "What Actions Are Needed"

The NTSB has determined that the captain of Colgan Air flight 3407 inappropriately responded to the activation of the stick shaker, which led to an aerodynamic stall from which the airplane did not recover. In a report was adopted Tuesday in a public Board meeting in Washington, additional flight crew failures were noted as causal to the accident.

As a result of this accident investigation, the Safety Board issued 25 recommendations to the FAA regarding strategies to prevent flight crew monitoring failures, pilot professionalism, fatigue, remedial training, pilot records, stall training, and airspeed selection procedures.  Additional recommendations address FAA's oversight and use of safety alerts for operators to transmit safety-critical information, flight operational quality assurance (FOQA) programs, use of personal portable electronic devices on the flight deck, and weather information provided to pilots.

The first recommendation listed would have the FAA require operators to review their standard operating procedures to verify that they are consistent with the flight crew monitoring techniques described in Advisory Circular (AC) 120-71A, “Standard Operating Procedures for Flight Deck Crewmembers”; if the procedures are found not to be consistent, revise the procedures according to the AC guidance to promote effective monitoring. Another would require that airspeed indicator display systems on all aircraft certified under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 25 and equipped with electronic flight instrument systems depict a yellow/amber cautionary band above the low-speed cue or the digits on the airspeed indicator change from white to amber/yellow as the speed approaches the low-speed cue, consistent with Federal Aviation Administration Advisory Circular 25-11A.

The board also recommends that the FAA identify which airplanes operated under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K are susceptible to tailplane stalls and then (1) require operators of those airplanes to provide an appropriate airplane-specific tailplane stall recovery procedure in their training manuals and company procedures and (2) direct operators of those airplanes that are not susceptible to tailplane stalls to ensure that training and company guidance for the airplanes explicitly state this lack of susceptibility and contain no references to tailplane stall recovery procedures.

At Tuesday's meeting, the Board announced that two issues that had been encountered in the Colgan Air investigation would be studied at greater length in proceedings later this year.  The Board will hold a public forum this Spring exploring pilot and air traffic control high standards.   This accident was one in a series of incidents investigated by the Board in recent years - including a mid-air collision over the Hudson River that raised questions of air traffic control vigilance, and the Northwest Airlines incident last year where the airliner overflew its destination airport in Minneapolis because the pilots were distracted by non-flying activities - that have involved air transportation professionals deviating from expected levels of performance. In addition, this Fall the Board will hold a public forum on code sharing, the practice of airlines marketing their services to the public while using other companies to actually perform the transportation.  For example, this accident occurred on a Continental Connection flight, although the transportation was provided by Colgan Air.

In a written response, the FAA said: "In the past year, the FAA has driven significant improvements in pilot professionalism, training, and background checks. We will soon publish proposed federal rules to prevent pilot fatigue and further improve training. Airline passengers deserve an expertly trained and well rested crew, whether they are flying on a major or a regional jet. Pilots must be trained for the mission they are flying and the FAA already is working to further improve their professional qualifications. The FAA will review and evaluate today's NTSB recommendations to help determine what further actions may be needed."

FMI: www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2010/AAR1001.htm