Says Current Doors Leave Cockpit Vulnerable While Open, Secondary Barriers Needed

The Airline Pilots Association, the largest Pilot Union in the world, is continuing its ongoing fight for a final rule requiring secondary flight deck barriers. Since their initial 2013 white paper describing the shortcomings of the current reinforced cockpit door, the Association has repeatedly petitioned the FAA, Department of Transportation, and the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) for the inclusion of a final rule that would create additional protection for flight deck operations.

Following Sept. 11, 2001, Congress mandated that airlines revise their cockpit entryways with reinforced doors more resistant to forced intrusion. An acceptable solution, while the door remains sealed. Unfortunately pilots often require lavatory use or temporary absence from the cockpit, leaving control of the aircraft vulnerable to dedicated assault from hostile actors. The solution has been a stopgap in which cabin crew block passenger access to the flight deck using improvised, non-fortified blockages. Galley carts or "human shields" do not establish a reliable system of prevention if faced with a highly motivated, dedicated charge from attackers. This vulnerability has been addressed in FAA Advisory Circular 120-110.

The recommended fix is a secondary barrier placed between the cabin and galley. Unlike the heavier, embedded cockpit door, this device can be lighter weight and stowable between the passenger cabin and flight deck door. One example design is a simple, resembling two posts with steel cabling across the doorway. Other more stout versions are included at the factory, as offered by Boeing and Airbus.

Retrofitting is cited to be approximately $5,000 for legacy aircraft. If implemented alongside revised crew procedures, the risk of flight deck intrusion could be decreased across the civil aviation system. 

ALPA also notes the current lack of primary flight deck fortification in cargo operators. Under current regulations, all-cargo air carriers are not required to secure their cockpits to the same level as passenger airlines. In theory, these operators carry no personnel or passengers in their cabin area, so security risk was thought to be low. In practice, however, this differs. Jumpseating arrangements, company personnel, and commuters often require carriage in cargo aircraft. The addition of the same security standards as main line passenger carriers could help prevent future hijackings. 

FMI: www.alpa.org/advocacy/flight-deck-barriers, www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_120-110.pdf