Cost-Consciousness Could Have Killed Columbia

When the Columbia Accident Investigation Board releases its final report, sometime before Labor Day, it will likely be a blistering blow to NASA. The board will probably recommend major changes in the space agency's "culture," as well as creation of an independent body to oversee flight safety issues. But will the CAIB address the bottom-line issues that may have contributed more than any other to the Columbia disaster?

We're Talking Money Here

Now, to be fair, NASA doesn't appropriate its own budget. The space agency makes a request, it becomes part of the president's budget and it gets mauled on Capitol Hill. Whatever Washington sends, NASA pretty much has to live with. Budgetary constraints were seen as a factor in the 1986 Columbia disaster. Now, it looks like those same sort of constraints helped doom Columbia.

The most experienced shuttle engineers in the world work at the Boeing plant in Huntington Beach (CA). They have more than 18 years' experience in thermal applications with specific regard to the shuttle program. But when, shortly after Columbia's last launch on January 16th, a chunk of insulating foam broke free of the external fuel tank and slammed into the shuttle's left wing, NASA didn't call on the Huntington Beach team.

Why?

As ANN reported earlier this year (ANN: February 24, 2003 -  "Is Columbia Plagued By Inexperience?"), Boeing transferred shuttle jobs to Houston in a consolidation that has cost the company scores of its most experienced shuttle engineers over the past two years -- including some of those who invented the methodology for debris damage and thermal analysis.

While Columbia was still early in its mission, Boeing managers relied on the Houston-based team of engineers who had never done this type of analysis in a real situation.

"This was their first flight," said an anonymous Boeing thermal systems engineer. "This was the first time they took over."

The Houston team analyzed a number of scenarios, ultimately predicting a "safe return" for Columbia. Boeing executives say that analysis as the "best answers possible" from the "best technical minds." On Friday, Allen said the company "absolutely" stood by that statement, even as new e-mails released from NASA last week suggested some inside the agency voiced strong doubts.

The Miami Herald reported Boeing's Huntington Beach engineers -- who helped invent the process -- say the Boeing team in Houston grossly mis-analyzed the data.

"Basically, they just didn't interpret the numbers right," the thermal systems engineer said. "They never properly identified the risk."

Their interviews with The Miami Herald echo the statements of numerous outside experts who have said the thermal analysis were flawed. And they raise a haunting question in the aftermath of the February 1 shuttle disintegration: Could NASA have saved the seven astronauts had it properly assessed the risk?

After the disaster, the California engineers say they were shocked to see the data that Boeing and NASA used to reach their conclusions. One chart relied on a computer program called "Crater" to come up with nine different damage scenarios. Any one of them could have been catastrophic, the thermal engineer here said, but the Houston analysts downplayed the results by saying that "Crater" tended to be conservative.

"When something like that hits you and your computer program tells you you're all the way through the thermal protection system for that big of an area, you're in big trouble," the thermal systems engineer said. "We had never seen a chart as bad as that."

NASA managers have also speculated that, if there was a serious risk of one wing falling apart, the shuttle could come in at a slightly different angle to put more heat on the good wing.

After the crash, NASA has repeatedly tried to downplay the possibility that damage caused by the debris that hit the orbiter's left wing actually led to the crash. Last week, NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe mocked reporters for focusing so much on foam, calling them "foamologists."

But the internal e-mails circulating among Boeing engineers in Huntington Beach show at least some have lingering doubts.

"NASA and Boeing Management are doing whatever they can to redirect attention away from that thermal analysis that was done by inexperienced thermal engineers rather than the guys that would normally have done it," it says.

Fatal Cost-Cutting?

There are two dynamics at play here. In the first, Congress (and therefore NASA) tightens the budget. After all, there are many on Capitol Hill who'd just as soon see the manned space program scrapped. They view it as a waste of resources. NASA, therefore, cuts funding to contractors as a result of the axe-weilding in Washington.

The second part of the equation is the NASA-think of doing things "better, faster cheaper," as a result of the cutbacks. Instead of re-evaluating its programs and priorities in the face of cutbacks, NASA managers instead did all they could to cram their original agenda into a budget three sizes too small.

Perhaps there was a sense of complacency about foam strikes on lifting orbiters. Still, because of budgetary concerns, the best minds capable of analyzing damage to the thermal tiles on the left wing's leading edge were left out of the loop.

Aero-News has long supported NASA and the amazing people who work for the space agency. That won't change. Yet, in the face of budget constraints, the term "getting the biggest bang for the buck" has taken on a new meaning of tragic proportions. As the CAIB finalizes its report to America, we hope it will address the "do more with less" attitude. Perhaps it's time for NASA to do less with less -- and make what is done as near-perfect as possible.

FMI: www.caib.gov