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Wed, Mar 09, 2005

NTSB Recommends Changes To Honeywell FMS

Safety Recommendations A-05-03 through -07

The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Aviation Administration:

Require Honeywell to modify its flight management system (FMS) software to annunciate warnings to the flight crew when a takeoff reference speed is changed by a value that would impede the airplane's ability to safely take off, and require all operators of airplanes with Honeywell FMS computers to incorporate this software modification. (A-05-03)

Require Honeywell to modify its flight management system (FMS) software to prevent entry of airplane weights that would result in landing weights below zero fuel weight or operating empty weight, and require all operators of airplanes with Honeywell FMS computers to incorporate this software modification.  (A-05-04)

Require Honeywell to modify its flight management system (FMS) software either to inhibit manual entries in the gross weight field or to allow the takeoff gross weight to be uplinked directly into the FMS, and require operators of airplanes with Honeywell FMSs to incorporate this software modification. (A-05-05)

Require Honeywell to conduct a study of its flight management system computers to identify any additional improvements that may be necessary for error checking and confirming that the entered takeoff and landing performance information is correct and reasonable. (A-05-06)

Require companies other than Honeywell that manufacture flight management systems (FMS) that are installed on 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 25 airplanes to study their FMS computers to identify any improvements that may be necessary for error checking and confirming that the entered takeoff and landing performance information is correct and reasonable.  (A-05-07)

FMI: www.ntsb.gov/Recs/letters/2005/A05_03_07.pdf

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