National Commission on September 11 Terrorist Attacks

It makes for chilling reading. The following is a transcript of testimony before the Commission by Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley, Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold and Col. Alan Scott May 23, 2003, all current or retired Air Force Officers who were based at NORAD on Sept. 11, 2001.

NORAD Timeline

Col. Alan Scott

Good morning Mr. Chairman, Commissioners.  It is my pleasure to be here with you today.  General Arnold and I worked together that day on September 11th.  What I will walk you through here is a chronology of the attacks and I presented it in a matrix form.  And the only thing I lay claim to is having studied all of the attacks and how they were interwoven together.  This was not a linear sequence of events where one attack began and ended and then a second attack began and ended.  This was a coordinated, well-planned attack.  We had multiple airplanes in the air.  The fog and friction of war was evident everywhere in the country both on the civil side as well as the military side. And this hopefully will show you how those interwoven events came about.  I will tell you that the times on this chart come from our logs.  The time on the chart is the time that's in the log.  It may not be the exact time the event happened.  It may be the time when the log keeper was advised or became aware of the event.

The first thing that happened in the morning, related to, related to the events at 9:02, or I'm sorry, 8:02 A.M., EST, is when American Airlines 11 took off out of Boston.  American Airlines 11 was a 767 and it was headed, I believe, to Los Angeles

Fourteen minutes later, also coming out of Boston Logan, United Airlines 175, a 757, also headed to Los Angeles, took off out of Boston and initially took roughly the same ground track as American 11.  Three minutes later American Airlines 77 took off out of Dulles here in Washington, also headed to Los Angeles and also a 757 and proceeded westbound towards the West Coast.  So now the first three airplanes are airborne together.

The first time that anything untoward and this was gleaned from FAA response and anything out of the ordinary happened was at 8:20 when the electronic transponder in American Airlines 11 blinked off, if you will, just disappeared from the screen. Obviously, the terrorists turned that transponder off and that airplane, although it did not disappear from the radar scope, it became a much, much more difficult target to discern for the controllers who now only could look at the primary radar return off the airplane. That was at 8:20.  At 8:40, in our logs is the first occasion where the FAA is reporting a possible hijacking of American Airlines Flight 11.  And the initial response to us at that time was a possible hijacking; it had not been confirmed.

At that same moment, the F-15 alert aircraft at Otis Air Force Base, Massachusetts, about 153 miles away were placed immediately on battle stations by the Northeast Air Defense Sector Commander.

At 8:43, as this is going on, the fourth airplane, United 93 takes off out of Newark, New Jersey.  It's a 757; it is headed for San Francisco.

At 8:46, our next log event, we get the last and by the way, much of this radar data for these primary targets was not seen that day.  It was reconstructed days later by the 84th Radar Evaluation Squadron and other agencies like it who are professionals at going back and looking at radar tapes and then given that they are loaded with knowledge after the fact, they can go and find things that perhaps were not visible during the event itself.

At 8:46, the last data, near the Trade Center.  8:46, the first impact on the Trade Center. At that minute is when the Otis F-15s were scrambled and, again, they are 153 miles away.  And that scramble came and Gen. Arnold, I'm sure can address this, based on the conversation between the Northeast Sector Commander and himself.

Those F-15s were airborne in six minutes.  That is well inside the time that is allowed for them to get airborne.  But because they were on battle stations, the pilots were in the cockpits ready to start engines, that scramble time was shortened by a significant amount of time.

At 8:53, that's a minute later, in the radar reconstruction, we are now picking up primary radar contacts off of the F-15s out of Otis.

At 8:57, which is seven minutes after the first impact is according to our logs when the FAA reports the first impact.  And about this time is when CNN coverage to the general public is beginning to appear on the TV, not of the impact, but of the burning tower shortly thereafter.  So, you can see what in the military, I'm sure you have heard us talk to the fog and friction of war.  And as the intensity increases, the lag tends to also increase for how quickly information gets passed.

At 9:02, United 175, the second airplane, which by the way, never turned off its transponder before impact, crashes into the North Tower, at 9:02.  The distance of those fighters which had been scrambled out of Otis, at that particular point they were still 71 miles away, about 8 minutes out and going very fast.

At 9:05, FAA reports a possible hijack of United 175.  Again that's 3 minutes after the impact in the Tower.  It's how long it is taking now for the information to flow through the system to the command and control agencies and through the command and control agencies to the pilots in the cockpits.

At 9:09, Langley F-16s are directed to battle stations just based on the general situation, and the breaking news and the general developing feeling about what's going on.  And about that same time, kind of way out in the west is when American 77, which in the meantime has turned off its transponder and turned left back toward Washington, appears back in radar coverage.  And my understanding is the FAA controllers now are beginning to pick up primary skin paints on that airplane and they don't know exactly whether that is 77 and they are asking a lot of people whether it is, including a C130 that's westbound toward Ohio.

At 9:11, the FAA reports a crash into the South Tower.  You can see now that lag time has increased from 7 minutes from impact to report, and now it's 9 minutes from impact to report and you can only imagine what's going on on the floors of the control centers around the country.

At 9:11, I just mentioned that, 9:16, now FAA reports a possible hijack of United Flight 93, which is out in the Ohio area.  That's the last flight that is going to impact the ground.

At 9:24, the FAA reports a possible hijack of 77.  That's some time after they had been tracking its primary target.  And at that moment as well is when the Langley F-16s were scrambled out of Langley.

At 9:25, American 77 is reported heading toward Washington, D.C., not exactly precise information, just general information, across the chat log.

9:27, Boston FAA reports a fifth aircraft missing, Delta Flight 89. And you people have never heard of Delta Flight 89.  We call that the first red herring of the day because there are a number of reported possible hijackings that unfolded over the hours immediately following the actual attack.  Delta 89 was not hijacked.  It enters the system.  It increases the fog and friction, if you will, as we begin to look for that.  But he lands about 7 or 8 minutes later and clears out of the system.

At 9:30, that Langley F-16s are airborne.  They are 105 miles away from the Washington area.

At 9:34, through chat, FAA is unable to precisely locate American Airlines Flight 77.

At 9:35, F-16s are reported airborne.  And many times, reported airborne is not exactly when they took off, it's just when the report came down that they were airborne.

At 9:37, we have the last radar data near the Pentagon and 9:40, immediately following that, is when 93 up North turns it transponder off, out in the West toward Ohio and begins a left turn back toward the East.

At 9:49, FAA reports that Delta 89, which had been reported as missing, is now reported as a possible hijacking so again, he is.... I'm sorry 9:41.  Again he is in the system.  He is kind of a red herring for us.

Now the only thing that I would point out on this chart is that this says 9:43, American Airlines 77 impacts the Pentagon (shown in simulation, above).  The timeline on the impact on the Pentagon was changed to 9:37.  9:43 is the time it was reported that day.  It was the time we used.  And it took about two weeks to discover in the parking lot of the Pentagon this entry camera for the parking lot, which happened to be oriented toward the Pentagon at the time of impact.  And the recorded time is 9:37.  And that's why the timeline went from 9:43 to 9:37 because it is the best documented evidence for the impact time that we have.

Getting toward the end now, 9:47 is when Delta 89 clears the system by landing in Cleveland.  So he is not a hijack.  Lots of things are going on now in the system as the Sectors begin to call both units that are part of First Airforce and NORAD as well as units that have nothing to do with us.  We are beginning to call everyone now and the 103rd Air Control Squadron, for instance, stationed in Connecticut is an Air Control Squadron, a radar squadron, and they got their radar online operational and begin to link their radar picture into the Northeast system.  They are not normally part of NORAD.  This is really the initial part of a huge push the rest of that day to link as many radars in on the interior as we can, and to get as many fighters on alert as we can.

At 10:02, United 93, last radar data and the estimated impact time for United 93 is 10:03.

At 10:07, FAA reports that there may be a bomb on board 93.  That's four minutes after the impact.

At 10:15, they report that it's crashed and you can see now the fog and friction lag time has increased from 7 minutes to 9 minutes to 15 minutes because of the level of activities that are going on.

And there are notations here about other airplanes as we begin to divert other airplanes that are just out intended for training that day.  We're picking up the phone, calling Syracuse the Air National Guard.  They are beginning to get flights airborne.  They are beginning to arm those aircraft with whatever weapons they have handy so we can posture that defense.

That is how the timeline unfolded.  As you can see, there is a fabric of interwoven actions, which is not just a linear event.  So lots of things going on, lots of activities, lots of CQ centers.  Sir, that concludes my piece.

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

Mr. Chairman, we thought, right up front, we'd put that on the record so that we could have that as a departure point for your questions. I again caveat by saying that this is the North American Aerospace Defense Command and Continental NORAD Region timeline.  Other agencies may have other logs that may have different times.  But this is the best and most accurate data that we could piece together for your Commissioner, sir.  With that, I open up to questions.

Thomas Kean, Committee Chairman

Thank you very much.  Commissioner Ben-Veniste?

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner

Good morning Gentlemen.  First I would like to personally commend each of you and the dedicated men and woman who serve our nation through NORAD.  I'd like to explain to you what you probably know already and that is that our mandate as the Commission is to provide the most detailed and accurate exposition in our final report of what occurred leading up to the 9/11 tragedy and the events subsequent thereto.  And so, please understand that our questions may be very pointed.  We mean no disrespect but we have our mission, as well. Now, Gen. McKinley, is it fair to say that the mission and the primary responsibility of NORAD is to defend our homeland and our citizens against air attack?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

On the day of September 11, 2001, our mission was to defend North America, to surveil, to intercept, to identify and if necessary to destroy those targets, which we were posturing were going to come from outside our country.  In fact, that tracks originating over the landmass of the United States were identified friendly by origin. Therefore, those alert sites that were positioned on the morning of September 11th, were looking out, primarily on our coasts at the Air Defense Identification Zone which extends outwards of 100 to 200 miles off our shore.  So that was the main focus of NORAD at the time.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner

I asked you about your responsibility, Sir.  And I ask you again whether it was not your responsibility as NORAD to protect the United States and its citizens against air attack?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

It is and it was and I would just caveat your comment by saying that our mission was, at that time, not designed to take internal FAA radar data, to track or to identify tracks originating within our borders.  It was to look outward as a Cold War vestige, primarily developed during the Cold War to protect against Soviet long-range bomber penetration of our intercept zone.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner

Well I think Sir, you have used a good term - not good for the United States but accurate, in terms of the vestigial mandate operationally to look outward toward the borders rather than inward.  And by vestigial, you mean I'm sure, as a result of our decades of confrontation with the former Soviet Union.

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

Correct, Sir.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner

And so, on the day of September 11th, if you can see these dots, I know it may be difficult to see, NORAD was positioned in a perimeter around the United States but nothing in the central region, nothing on the border with Canada.

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

That's correct, Sir.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner

Now let me ask you sir, whether the concept of terrorists using an airplane as a weapon was something unknown to the intelligence community on September 10th, 2001?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

Very good question...

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner

Thank you.

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

And I asked our staff to provide me some data on what they had that morning.  As I said, Gen. Arnold was at the helm that morning.  But basically, the comments I received from my staff was that there was no intelligence indication at any level within NORAD or DOD of a terrorist threat to commercial aviation prior to the attacks.  And information from the daily Joint Chiefs Intelligence Report on the morning of September 11th indicated no specific dangers or threats within the country.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner

My question Sir, and I mean no disrespect but we will save time if you'll listen to what ask you.  My question is: the concept of terrorists using airplanes as weapons was not something which was unknown to the U.S. Intelligence community on September 10th, 2001. Isn't that fair to say?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

I would like the Intelligence community to address that.  I would find it hard to believe that they hadn't speculated against that. But it was unavailable to us at the time.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner

Well, let's start for example with September 12th, 1994.  A Cessna 150L crashed into the south lawn of the White House barely missing the building and killing the pilot.  Similarly, in December of 1994, an Algerian armed Islamic group in Paris hijacked an Air France flight in Algiers and threatened to crash it into the Eiffel Tower. In October of 1996, the Intelligence community obtained information regarding an Iranian plot to hijack a Japanese plane over Israel and crash it into Tel Aviv.  In August of 1998, the Intelligence community obtained information that a group of unidentified Arabs planned to fly an explosive-laden plane from a foreign country into the World Trade Center.  The information was passed on to the FBI and the FAA. 

In September of 1998, the Intelligence community obtained information that Osama bin Laden's next operation could possibly involve flying an aircraft loaded with explosives into a U.S. airport and detonating it.  In August 2001, the Intelligence Community obtained information regarding a plot to either bomb the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi from an airplane or crash an airplane into it. 

In addition, in the Atlanta Olympics, the United States government and the Dept. of Justice and my colleague Jamie Gorelick were involved in planning against possible terrorist attacks at the Olympics, which included the potential of an aircraft flying into the stadium.  In July 2001, the G8 Summit in Genoa, attended by our President - among the measures that were taken, were positioning surface-to-air missiles, ringing Genoa, closing the Genoa airport and restricting all airspace over Genoa.  Was not this information, Sir, available to NORAD as of September 11th, 2001?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

It's obvious, by your categorization that those events all took place and that NORAD had that information.  I would only add, Sir, that the intelligence data that we postured our forces for and the training, and the tactics, and the procedures that we used to prepare our missions for support of the Combatant Commander of NORAD, had hijacking as a primary intercept tactic.  And we have some of the finest fighter pilots as you know in the world who are some of the best people in the world, who can do their mission extremely well. But we had not postured, prior to September 11th, 2001, for the scenario that took place that day.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner

Well, obviously, it would be hard to imagine posturing for the exact scenario but isn't it a fact, Sir, that prior to September 11th, 2001, NORAD had already in the works, plans to simulate in an exercise, a simultaneous hijacking of two planes in the United States.

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

Col. Scott, do you have any data on that?  I'm not aware of that, Sir.  I was not present at the time.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner

That was operation Amalgam Virgo.

Col. Alan Scott

Yes, Sir.  Specifically, operation Amalgam Virgo, which I was involved in before I retired, was a scenario using a Third-World United, not United, uninhabited aerial vehicle launched off a rogue freighter in the Gulf of Mexico.  General Arnold can back me up, at the time, one of our greatest concerns was the proliferation of cruise missile technology and the ability for terrorists groups to get that technology and get it close enough to our shores to launch it.  In fact, this exercise, in this exercise we used actual drone, MQM 107 drones, which are about the size of a cruise missile to exercise our fighters and our radars in a Gulf of Mexico scenario.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner

You are referring to Amalgam '01, are you not?

Col. Alan Scott

Yes, Sir.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner

I'm referring to Amalgam '02, which was in the planning stages prior to September 11th, 2001, Sir.  Is that correct?

Col. Alan Scott

That was after I retired and I was not involved in '02.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner

Will you accept that the exercise involved a simultaneous hijacking scenario?

Col. Alan Scott

I was not involved in '02.

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

Sir, I do have some information on '02, if you would allow me to read it for the record?

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner

Please.

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

Amalgam Virgo, in general, '02, was an exercise created to focus on peacetime and contingency NORAD missions.  One of the peacetime scenarios that is and has been a NORAD mission for years is support to other government departments.  Within this mission falls hijackings.  Creativity of the designer aside, prior to 9/11, hijack motivations were based on political objectives, ie: asylum or release of captured prisoners or political figures.  Threats of killing hostages or crashing were left to the scriptwriters to invoke creativity and broaden the required response for players.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner

Well, isn't that a bit fatuous given the specific information that I've given you?  It wasn't in the minds of scriptwriters when the Algerians had actually hijacked a plane which they were attempting to fly into the Eiffel Tower and all the other scenarios which I've mentioned to you.  I don't mean to argue with you but my question is, Sir, given the awareness of the terrorists' use of planes as weapons, how was it that NORAD was still focusing outward in protecting the United States against attacks from the Soviet Union or elsewhere and was not better prepared to defend against the hijackings scenarios of a commercial jet, laden with fuel, used as a weapon to target citizens of the United States?  When you say, our training, our mission was vestigial, I think you said it in capsulated form but would you agree that on the basis of the information available, that there could have been better preparedness by NORAD to meet this threat?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

In retrospect, Sir, I think I would agree with your comment.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner

With respect to the bases that were available for protecting the East Coast, and Col. Scott has gone through the scrambling of aircraft, I want to focus just on one flight, Flight 77, and then, Secretary Lehman will ask you some more specific questions.  With respect to Flight 77, Sir, you testified previously before the House Armed Services Committee and you were - I'm sorry, General Eberhart was questioned.  You are familiar with his testimony, Sir?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

Yes Sir.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner

Okay.  He was questioned about Flight 77 and because of the use of Langley Airbase, which is 105 miles from our Capitol, as opposed to say Andrews Air Force Base, which is in the neighborhood, the question arises again about the positioning and the thought behind the positioning of fighter planes to protect our Capitol in an enhanced terrorist threat situation, such as existed on September 10th, September 9th, 2002.  Let me ask you about Flight 77 again. The question was, the timeline that we've been given is that at 8:55 on September 11th, American Airlines Flight 77 began turning east, away from it's intended course and at 9:10, Flight 77 was detected by the FAA radar over West Virginia, heading east.  That was after the two planes had already struck the Trade Center towers.  Is that correct Col. Scott?

Col. Alan Scott

Yes Sir

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner

Now, 15 minutes later at 9:25, the FAA notified NORAD, according to the statement, that Flight 77 was headed toward Washington.  (reading from the record)

"Was that the first notification at 9:25 that NORAD or DOD had that Flight 77 was probably hijacked?  And if it was, do you know why it took 15 minutes for the FAA to notify NORAD?"

General Eberhart said, "Sir, there is one minor difference, I showed it as 9:24 which you do as well that we were notified and that's the first notification that we received."

"Do you know if that was the first notification to DOD?"

"Yes, Sir, that's the first documented notification that we received"

And I want to focus on the word "documented" because it's very important for us to know when NORAD actually received notification given the fact that the planes had already crashed into the World Trade Center and given, I'm sure, the assumption that these were terrorist acts and there could be more coming, more planes coming. Is it, in fact correct Sir that the first notification of any type that NORAD received was not until 9:24 with respect to Flight 77?

Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley

With your concurrence Sir, I would like to ask Gen. Arnold to address that.  He was on the floor that morning.

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

The simple answer to your question is that I believe that to be the fact.  That 9:24 was the first time that we had been advised of American 77 as a possible hijacked airplane.  Our focus, you've got to remember, that there is a lot of other things going on simultaneous here, was on United 93, which was being pointed out to us very aggressively, I might say, by the FAA.  Because our radar is looking outward and not inward, the only way for us to know where anything was for the FAA to pass along that information to us.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner

Is it not the case, Gen. Arnold, that there was an open line established between FAA, NORAD and other agencies, including CIA and FBI that morning?

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

Well, I wasn't on that line at that particular time if that were the case.  In fact, there was an open line established between our sectors at really the tactical level where they're controlling the aircraft, talking to the FAA controllers from time-to-time.  We did not have an open line at that time with the FAA.  That is not accurate.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner

You did not.  You were not, NORAD was not in contact by...

Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold

The Continental United States NORAD region, my headquarters, we are responsible for the Continental United States air defense, did not have an open line with the FAA at that time.

Richard Ben-Veniste, Commissioner

Was there some NORAD office that had an open line with the FAA (crosstalk).  Excuse me, let me finish my question, please.  Was there some NORAD office, and you'll forgive us because we had asked for this information prior to the hearing from FAA and did not receive it.  But we are advised that there was indeed an open line between either the net or some other name given to a essentially an ongoing conference, whereunder, in real-time, FAA was providing information as it received it, immediately after the first crash into the towers, we are told, with respect to each of the events that were ongoing of any remarkable nature.  I see Gen. McKinley is nodding.

Indeed, there was an open line at one point between Air Defense officials in the Northeast Sector of the US and NORAD. That story and the rest of the testimony from May 23, 2003, coming up soon.

FMI: www.9-11commission.gov