Additional NTSB, OIG Correspondence Released

We ran a chilling story last week, about CFI Joe Brinell, 54, who, along with his companions in a Citation, were killed in a landing accident in December, 1999. At that time, we thought it was clear, from recently-released material held by Cong. Roy Blunt (R-MO), that Brinell had been overly harassed by the FAA. Here are additional findings, released by Blunt's office, that come directly from the government offices of the DoT's Inspector General.

NTSB's Findings:

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), in its June 2001 Accident  Investigation Report, concluded that the crash resulted from pilot error under adverse weather conditions. The NTSB report included the following narrative based on an interview its accident investigator conducted:

"A corporate operator and friend of the pilot [Mr. Brinell] said that he met the pilot [on December 9, 1999] after the pilot's airplane landed at St. Louis . . . [Mr. Brinell] said, 'I need to talk to you.' . . . He said that [Mr. Brinell] told him that he hadn't slept for three days, and expressed that a supervisor in the Kansas City FSDO 'is trying to destroy me.'"

FAA's Internal Investigation

By letter dated February 25, 2000, you [Blunt] requested FAA to investigate allegations you received from Mr. Brinell's widow, Grace Brinell, that the Kansas City FSDO had wrongfully targeted Mr. Brinell for regulatory enforcement. FAA subsequently convened a team of three Aviation Safety Inspectors from within its Central Region to conduct an internal investigation. FAA reported its findings to you by correspondence signed by the Deputy Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification, dated July 3, 2000, and October 10, 2000.

Significantly, among its investigative findings, FAA concluded that the FSDO's May 1999 attempted formal re-examination of Mr. Brinell's pilot competency, which could have led to revocation of his Airline Transport Pilot certificate, was not warranted. However, FAA further found, as reported to you in its October 10, 2000, letter, that the FSDO was 'not remiss in its oversight responsibilities or abusive in exercising its empowerment to re-examine Mr. Brinell, and the actions taken by the FSDO [Supervisor] were appropriate.'

OIG's Review of FAA's Investigation

Based on your concerns about the adequacy of FAA's internal investigation, you subsequently requested that we examine its thoroughness and accuracy, and we (The NTSB) cited as its investigative findings the following: (1) Proper altitude - not maintained - pilot in command; (2) Fatigue (lack of sleep) - pilot in command; (3) Weather condition - low ceiling; (4) Use of inappropriate medication/drug - pilot in command; (5) Weather condition - rain; and (6) Pressure induced by others - FAA inspector.

Regarding finding #4, per NTSB's report, Mr. Brinell had been taking a commonly prescribed medication known as Sinequan, which reportedly may cause drowsiness.

Report No. CC-2001-221

Reported our findings to you by letter dated December 4, 2001. We identified a number of troubling irregularities, the most significant of which was an evident lack of objectivity and an underlying bias in favor of FSDO personnel, against whom the allegations were made, thereby compromising the integrity of FAA's investigation.

Specifically, we found that one of the team members, at the outset of the investigation, told the team that they had 'reputations to protect.' We were also told that the team leader advised the team to consider that FSDO personnel subject to the allegations had applied for promotions. Further, we found serious omissions from FAA's Report of Investigation, including a dissenting report prepared by a member of FAA's investigative team that highlighted deficiencies in FAA's investigation. These omissions gave rise to the perception of bias in FAA's internal investigation.

We also found that remedial action pledged by the FAA in its correspondence to you concerning FSDO personnel assignment changes was ambiguous in terms of what action FAA intended to take, and that specific action directed by management was not adhered to. For instance, despite assurances to you that specific inspectors would no longer be assigned duties at the College, one of these individuals who had pursued enforcement-related actions against Mr. Brinell was seen by Mrs. Brinell at the College, sitting at her late husband's desk with his feet on top of the desk.

Based on our findings, we advised you that it was appropriate for our office to re-investigate the underlying alleged FSDO improprieties concerning FAA's oversight of Mr. Brinell and the College of the Ozarks. This letter presents the results of our follow-on investigation. We would be pleased to brief you and your staff on our investigation.

The FSDO General Aviation Supervisor was promoted to the position of FSDO Manager while FAA conducted its internal investigation. Currently, this individual is the Acting Assistant Regional Flight Standards Division Manager. To date, a permanent selection for that position has not been made.

Report No. CC-2001-221
OIG's Investigation of Alleged Harassment by the FSDO

Summary of Findings

We found that between March 1999 and the crash in December 1999, the FSDO's General Aviation Supervisor and a Principal Operations Inspector took a series of three enforcement-related actions against Mr. Brinell, each of which posed a threat to his livelihood in commercial aviation.

These actions were (a) an attempt to strip Mr. Brinell of his pilot examiner status; (b) a directed re-examination of his pilot proficiency, potentially resulting in the revocation of his transport pilot's license; and (c) direction for him to turn-in to the FSDO all of his logbooks, documenting his history as a pilot, as part of an investigation into alleged unauthorized check-rides given by Mr. Brinell.

In reviewing these actions, we found that they were unwarranted and the FSDO's justification lacked credibility. The following summarizes our findings for each of  these actions, along with a troubling inconsistency in FAA.s October 10, 2000, correspondence to you:

• In March 1999, the Supervisor and Operations Inspector inappropriately attempted to relieve Mr. Brinell of his Designated Pilot Examiner authorization based on an undocumented belief that he had been a poor representative of the FAA...
• Directed Re-examination of Mr. Brinell.s Pilot Competency In May 1999, the Supervisor and Principal Operations Inspector wrongfully directed Mr. Brinell to submit to a re-examination of his pilot competency for reasons not relevant to his status as a pilot...
• Both the Inspector and Supervisor stated that their actual intent in directing the re-examination was to get Mr. Brinell's attention...
• The Supervisor and Operations Inspector continued to pursue re-examination of Mr. Brinell, even after an FAA Regional attorney counseled the Supervisor against it... ...we found the actions of the Supervisor and Operations Inspector to be inconsistent with policy guidance restricting re-examinations prescribed in FAA.s Inspector's Handbook.
• Additionally, we found indicia of disparate treatment of Mr. Brinell, in that FSDO records reflect that no other pilots were subjected to re-examination of their pilot competency for maintenance-related violations unless they were found to have operated an aircraft at the time violations occurred.
• Moreover, while the FSDO Supervisor targeted Mr. Brinell's pilot competency based on his position of overall responsibility for the College's aviation program, he did not pursue re-examination of the College's Director of Maintenance, relative to his mechanic's certificate. We question the Supervisor's rationale, albeit flawed.
• For attempting to hold Mr. Brinell personally accountable, when the Director of Maintenance had day-to-day responsibility for the College's aircraft maintenance program and thus was in a more direct position to take corrective action.
• ...We found the Supervisor.s explanation for requiring Mr. Brinell.s logbooks to lack credibility, and other circumstances of this action questionable. Moreover, the prior inappropriate conduct of the Supervisor and Inspector, in targeting Mr. Brinell for enforcement actions, taints its legitimacy.
• ...The Inspector told us while he did have a telephone conversation with Mr. Brinell, he did not recall what they discussed, but said he would not have given verbal approval. However, the Inspector acknowledged having given other pilots such authorization in the past...
• Finally, we found a troubling inconsistency reported to you in FAA's October 10, 2000, letter signed by the Deputy Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification. While the letter stated that the FSDO's directed re-examination of Mr. Brinell was not warranted, it qualified that finding by asserting that the FSDO had not been remiss and the actions of the FSDO Supervisor in pursuing the re-examination were appropriate.
• Based on our findings, these statements are inherently inconsistent and should not have been reported to you. During the course of both our initial and subsequent investigations, we found no support for FAA's conclusion that the actions of the FSDO were appropriate.

We are transmitting our full Report of Investigation, including all interview transcripts, to the FAA Administrator, along with the following recommendations:

1. That FAA consider appropriate disciplinary and other administrative action against the FSDO Supervisor and Operations Inspector based on their culpability in this matter. Due to the gravity of our investigative results, we question the Supervisor.s suitability to serve as the FSDO Manager, the permanent position to which he was promoted while FAA.s internal investigation was ongoing. We also recommend that FAA consider terminating the Supervisor's present assignment as Acting Assistant Regional Flight Standards Manager.

The FAA was previously apprised of our initial investigative findings, including the promotion of the FSDO Supervisor to FSDO Manager during the conduct of FAA's internal investigation, and agreed to hold any future promotions in abeyance pending the results of our follow-on investigation.

2. That the FAA Administrator correspond to you, as well as to Mrs. Brinell, regarding actions taken pursuant to our investigative findings and recommendations. It is our position that, to date, you and Mrs. Brinell have not been provided with an adequate, straightforward response from FAA.

3. That FAA apply the results of this investigation in reinforcing with its Flight Standards inspection workforce the appropriate protocols and criteria for such enforcement-related actions as re-examination of certificate holders and directing pilots to submit their logbooks to FSDOs.

4. That FAA take steps to ensure that the Kansas City FSDO, along with other FSDOs, follow prescribed record retention procedures. We find it troubling that the FSDO had no record of Mr. Brinell.s 1995 Letter of Authorization for the Cessna 310.

We note that this is the third investigation we have conducted over the last three years involving fatal general aviation accidents and alleged improprieties on the part of FSDOs. In the two prior cases, both of which were requested by Members of Congress, we found FSDO personnel to have been remiss in performing their regulatory oversight functions.

In one case, in FAA's Eastern Region, the then-Regional Flight Standards Manager and his then-Assistant Manager took significant disciplinary and other administrative action pursuant to our findings and recommendations.  These executives, who now serve in the capacity of Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification, and Director of Flight Standards, respectively, were not in their current positions at the time of FAA.s October 10, 2000, correspondence to you.

We recently discussed this investigation with them and they consider our results to be of a serious nature. They expressed a strong commitment to personally review our investigative results and take appropriate action. Separately, we will be providing the complete report of investigation on this matter to the FAA Administrator. We have asked them to inform us, within 30 days, of action they intend to take and this will be reported to you in a timely manner.

Sincerely, Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector General

FMI: www.faa.gov, www.ntsb.gov; www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20001212X20197&key=1; www.oig.dot.gov/item_details.php?item=960