To Boldly Go—Over Budget

NASA intends to once again land human beings in the moon. The space agency intends, also, to bring Mars within the purview of human exploration.

These lofty and concomitant goals are largely dependent on the ongoing development of the Space Launch System (SLS)—a two-stage, heavy-lift rocket that will launch the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (Orion) into space.

Currently, NASA is developing two mobile launchers at its Kennedy Space Center in Florida. Each massive construct comprises a two-story base structure—the platform to support the SLS vehicle—and a tower equipped with connection lines; launch accessories; and a walkway for personnel, equipment, and astronauts. Once complete, the mobile launchers will facilitate the launch of various iterations of the integrated SLS/Orion system.

Construction of the first mobile launcher (ML-1) was completed in 2010. In 2019, NASA awarded a $383-million contract to Bechtel National, Inc.— the American engineering, procurement, construction, and project management company—to design, build, test, and commission the second mobile launcher (ML-2).

In March 2020, the NASA Office of Inspector General issued a report addressing the ongoing development of both mobile launchers. Subject report examined the extent to which the space agency is meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals for the ML-2 contract. The report brings to light shocking    overruns, and speaks to the inefficiencies, greed, profiteering, and breathtaking ineptitude with which U.S. Governmental programs are afflicted.

To wit.

NASA, by current estimates, will spend 2.5 times ($1-billion) more than initially planned for the ML-2 contract, and take delivery of the completed launcher 2.5 years later than scheduled.

As of May 2022, design work on the ML-2 remained incomplete.

Consequently, Bechtel officials do not expect actual construction of the launcher to begin until the first quarter of fiscal year 2023–at the earliest. When construction does begin, NASA expects unforeseen but inevitable technical challenges to engender further cost increases and delays. 

Once the new launcher is delivered, NASA testing requirements will see its operational debut pushed back to at least November, 2026. 

Compounding Bechtel’s projected cost increases and schedule delays, an ML-2 project analysis provided only a

3.9 percent confidence level that the nearly $1 billion cost and October 2025 delivery estimates were accurate. 

The Office of the Inspector General made a number of suggestions pertaining to better tracking spending, schedules, and keeping NASA and its contractors accountable for overruns, but the reports overall tenor suggested the goal of getting to the Moon by 2024 is no longer possible.

FMI: www.nasa.gov