See, There Ya Go Applying Logic To The Situation...

In a scathing editorial this week titled "Screening Dreams," New York Times columnist Clark Kent Ervin accuses the Transportation Security Administration of merely going through the motions to convey a false sense of security to airline travelers.

"The security bureaucracy seems to think that as long as it is seen as doing something, and so long as another terror attack does not occur, the public will at least feel secure enough not to insist that it do whatever needs to be done actually to make us secure," Ervin writes.

There are numerous examples to back up that position, Ervin adds, including a series of recent embarrassments for the agency in which testers were able to slip potential bomb components through numerous checkpoints with abandon. But a perfect example, Ervin says, is the TSA's ban on liquids following the thwarting of a bomb plot in Britain last year... in which terrorists attempted to smuggle liquid explosives onboard in carry-on luggage, to be combined to create a bomb inflight.

"Because no technology had been developed to detect or thwart liquid explosives, the Transportation Security Administration was forced to take, for a time, the Draconian step of banning all liquids and gels," Ervin writes. "We were told at the time that even liquids and gels that are harmless in and of themselves could become incendiary when combined in sufficient quantity... And, then, without yet developing any effective counter-technology, the TSA relaxed the ban somewhat. Small quantities of liquids and gels can now be brought through security, provided they are sealed in clear plastic bags. And any quantity of liquids and gels can be purchased at airport vendors past checkpoints."

Ervin questions why even small quantities of liquids and gels are allowed, when in theory the danger still remains. "And, yet, the TSA can say that it’s done something; the "something" done doesn't unduly inconvenience the traveler or crimp the economy; and there’s no hell to pay because no terrorist has yet exploited this loophole to pull off another attack," he says.

Such an attitude also explains how agents are often able to sneak bomb components and other weapons through security checkpoints, despite TSA claims it screens every passenger. Ervin points to a recent study by the Government Accountability Office which found screeners at 19 airports failed to detect bomb components, as reported by ANN.

"At least the TSA's defense was audacious, laughably so," Ervin writes. "The agency chief, Kip Hawley, more or less told Congress that poor results were to be expected because undercover tests nowadays are much more sophisticated than they were before 9/11. In other words, it’s a good thing that screeners are consistently failing these tests because otherwise the tests wouldn’t be much of a test."

If you have the feeling Ervin isn't a fan of the TSA, you're right. Nor is he comforted by the agency's assertion there are multiple layers of security... so if one layer fails, there are 18 more opportunities for screeners to catch a wannabe terrorist in the act.

"Security layers as a whole constitute a chain that is only as strong as its weakest link," Ervin writes. "The screener link in this chain is very weak, indeed. And, as links go, this is arguably the most important one. Barring the occasional exception, the only time that passengers and their carry-ons are screened for weapons is at the checkpoint.

"If ignorance is bliss, let those of who believe TSA press releases be happy," Ervin concludes. "And if it is better to be lucky than good, TSA, so far at least, has it made."

One poster to the NYT blog, identified as "Eric," was even more succinct in his follow-up comment. "TSA is incompetent. They fail miserably at virtually everything they do."

FMI: Read The NYT Op-Ed, www.tsa.gov