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Tue, Jan 15, 2002

May Sea Fury Crash Explained

Last May, as we wondered what could have happened ("Bad Weekend for Brit Fliers," 05-15-01, ANN) to race-engine legend Paul Morgan (the engine designer who co-founded Ilmor Engineering), we took short looks at the accident, in his Sea Fury, that took his life.

We reported ("R.I.P., Dr. Gene Bouchard, Paul Morgan," 05-14-01, ANN), prior to our knowing that he was using a Sea Fury for the duties, "Before he took off in his plane to have a look at his garden, Morgan's son told reporters, Morgan, an inveterate tinkerer, had been working on his motorcycle."

The pieces of the story of his death have come together now, in a recently-published account by the Air Accidents Investigation Branch.

Morgan, 52, had a total of just over 900 hours' flight time, with about 55 in type, before the flight, that ended on the soaked turf. Understandably being kind of a ' power junkie,' he also had a number of other hot aircraft in his stable: the report notes he had, "...a collection of historic tailwheel aircraft which comprised a DHC-1 Chipmunk, North American T-6G Texan, North American P-51D Mustang, FG-1D Corsair and the Hawker Sea Fury." They were all professionally maintained.

The weather had been soggy, even worse than usual, and the Sea Fury needed exercise.

Morgan was landing, and landed a bit long, a bit left of center, and a bit hot. Witnesses and postcrash evidence say he bounced a bit, slowing down, but not getting the tail planted. He was killed in the rollover, as the cockpit was crushed when the big plane nosed over, at nearly zero forward speed.

The following is directly from the accident report:

It is understood that prior to its import into the UK from the USA, this aircraft had been modified to remove protective structures installed by the manufacturer immediately behind the pilot's station, and which historically have provided pilots with a measure of protection during turn-over type accidents. This was apparently done in order make space available for the installation of a jump seat behind the pilot, within the original canopy glazing, allowing a passenger to be carried. A similarly modified aircraft suffered a fatal landing accident in similar circumstances in the United States during 1996. However, in both accidents, the aircraft came to rest inverted on unprepared surfaces and the effectiveness of such a protective structure in these circumstances is not proven.

Analysis

In summary, the physical evidence at the accident site was consistent with the aircraft landing slightly deep, to the left of the centreline, whilst tracking slightly towards the left edge of the runway in a normal wheeled (tail up) attitude and carrying some excess speed. Thereafter, it progressed in a tail-up attitude along the left side of the runway, in a series of light bounces without ever settling into to a three point attitude, before encountering a region of soft ground with transverse undulations where the tyres broke through the surface and sank to depths of up to 15 cm. It appears that the consequent increase in wheel drag altered the balance of forces on the aircraft to an extent which caused it to tip irretrievably nose down and turn over onto its back.

The wheel brake system fitted to this aircraft was modified prior to its importation into the UK, the original system being replaced by one derived (it is believed) from an F102 jet fighter. Whilst there is no evidence that the brakes caused or contributed to this accident, the practical effects of these modifications in terms of overall braking effectiveness and controllability remain unclear.

Assuming an engine idle speed in the range from 700 to 800 rpm, the spacing of the propeller cuts in the soil corresponded to an aircraft ground speed of 40 to 50 kt at the time that the aircraft started to tip onto its nose. The aircraft's stalling speed in the landing configuration, power off, was around 87 kt. It is therefore likely that the elevator would have been aerodynamically ineffective, leaving the pilot with no means of preventing the aircraft from nosing over once the propeller strikes had occurred.

FMI: http://www.aaib.dtlr.gov.uk/bulletin/jan02/geemv.htm 

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