Says More Needs To Be Done On Fuel Tank Safety

With the 10th anniversary of the crash of TWA Flight 800 approaching, last week the National Transportation Safety Board released a fact sheet that reviews lessons learned from the accident investigation... and the progress toward ensuring that similar tragedies do not happen in the future.

The Board's review found that significant safety improvements have been implemented over the past ten years, but that more needs to be done to avoid another accident like TWA 800.

"The crash of TWA 800 was a watershed event for the air carrier industry," said NTSB Acting Chairman Mark V. Rosenker. "In the intervening years, a lot of thought and effort has been devoted to the issues raised by this accident, and the public is safer for it."

TWA 800, a Boeing 747, crashed on July 17, 1996, minutes after takeoff from John F. Kennedy International Airport on a flight to Paris, France. All 230 persons aboard the airplane died in the accident. The Safety Board conducted an exhaustive four-year investigation and determined that the accident was caused by an explosion in the center wing fuel tank, resulting from ignition of the flammable fuel/air mixture in the tank.

The NTSB says the most prominent issues raised by the TWA 800 accident concerned protection against flammable fuel tank vapors, and aging electrical systems.

Rosenker noted that fleet-wide inspections and analytical reviews of fuel tank design have resulted in significant measures that have the potential to reduce the likelihood of an ignition event inside a tank, and that fuel pumps, fuel quantity indicating systems, in-tank wiring, co-routed wiring, and operational procedures have been modified to make fuel systems safer.

"Equally important," Rosenker said, "is the prospect of substantially reducing fuel tank flammability exposure - something that was seen as impractical ten years ago but is now feasible, even in this difficult era when airline operators need to be extremely conscious of costs."

But while applauding the FAA and industry for the progress that has been made, Rosenker cautioned that the process is moving much too slowly.

"Ten years after the TWA accident, fuel tank inerting systems are not in place on our airliners, and flammability exposure is largely unchanged. And proposed rule changes do not include the majority of fuel tanks which are in the wings of transport airplanes, nor this country's large fleet of cargo aircraft."

Consequently, he added, reduction in fuel tank flammability remains on the NTSB's Most Wanted List of Safety Improvements.

Rosenker also expressed disappointment that the FAA did not act on the NTSB's immediate, interim recommendations, issued a few months after the TWA accident, that were aimed at reducing the fuel tank flammability problem until longer- term solutions are in place. The recommendation was closed by the Safety Board last year and given an "unacceptable action" status.

Rosenker noted that the TWA accident gave great impetus to legislation that revolutionized the ability of the families of the victims to obtain accurate and timely information about an airliner accident and the subsequent investigation.

FMI: www.ntsb.gov