Panel Found FAA's 'Limited Involvement' Led To Its Inability To Properly Assess The MCAS System

The 737 MAX Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR) report released by the FAA late last week finds fault with the agency and Boeing for issues with the MCAS which led to two fatal accidents earlier this year.

The report is expressly critical of the FAA's Organization Designation Authority (ODA) program under which Boeing was granted designee authority over parts of the certification project. FAA oversight of the certification process was performed by the FAA’s Boeing Aviation Safety Oversight Office (BASOO).

The JATR team concluded that FAA resource shortfalls in the BASOO (and other allocated resources) may have contributed to an inadequate number of FAA specialists being involved in the B737 MAX certification program. In some cases, BASOO engineers had limited experience and knowledge of key technical aspects of the B737 MAX program.

The BASOO delegated a high percentage of approvals and findings of compliance to the Boeing ODA for the B737 MAX program. With adequate FAA engagement and oversight, the extent of delegation does not in itself compromise safety. However, in the B737 MAX program, the FAA had inadequate awareness of the MCAS function which, coupled with limited involvement, resulted in an inability of the FAA to provide an independent assessment of the adequacy of the Boeing proposed certification activities associated with MCAS. In addition, signs were reported of undue pressures on Boeing ODA engineering unit members (E-UMs) performing certification activities on the B737 MAX program, which further erodes the level of assurance in this system of delegation.

JATR team members recommend that the FAA conduct a workforce review of the BASOO engineer staffing level to ensure there is a sufficient number of experienced specialists to adequately perform certification and oversight duties, commensurate with the extent of work being performed by Boeing. The workforce levels should be such that decisions to retain responsibility for finding compliance are not constrained by a lack of experienced engineers.

The FAA should review the Boeing Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) work environment and ODA manual to ensure the Boeing ODA engineering unit members (E-UMs) are working without any undue pressure when they are making decisions on behalf of the FAA. This review should include ensuring the E-UMs have open lines of communication to FAA certification engineers without fear of punitive action or process violation.

The team also reviewed how the Changed Product Rule process was applied to the certification of the flight control system of the B737 MAX. The JATR team determined that the Changed Product Rule process was followed and that the process was effective for addressing discrete changes. However, the team determined that the process did not adequately address cumulative effects, system integration, and human factors issues.

The Changed Product Rule process allows the applicant to only address in a limited way changed aspects (and areas affected by the change) and does not require analysis of all interactions at the aircraft level.

JATR team members recommend that the FAA work with other civil aviation authorities to revise the harmonized approach to the certification of changed products.

Other recommendations included:

• The FAA update regulations and guidance that are out of date and update certification procedures to ensure that the applied requirements, issue papers, means of compliance, and policies fully address the safety issues related to state-of-the-art designs employed on new projects.
• The FAA review and update the regulatory guidance pertaining to the type certification process with particular emphasis on early FAA involvement to ensure the FAA is aware of all design assumptions, the aircraft design, and all changes to the design in cases where a changed product process is used.
• The FAA promote a safety culture that drives a primary focus on the creation of safe products, which in turn comply with certification requirements.
• The FAA should ensure achievement of the close coupling that is required between the applicant safety analysis process and the development assurance process to classify failure conditions and derive the level of rigor of design development and verification.
• The FAA should require the integration of certification and operational functions during the certification process. The FAA should be provided all system differences between related aircraft in order to adequately evaluate operational impact, systems integration, and human performance.

"I thank Chairman Chris Hart and the Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR) members for their unvarnished and independent review (PDF) of the certification of the Boeing 737 MAX," FAA administrator Stephen Dickson said in a statement posted on the agency website.

"As FAA Administrator, I will review every recommendation and take appropriate action.

"Today’s unprecedented U.S. safety record was built on the willingness of aviation professionals to embrace hard lessons and to seek continuous improvement. We welcome this scrutiny and are confident that our openness to these efforts will further bolster aviation safety worldwide. The accidents in Indonesia and Ethiopia are a somber reminder that the FAA and our international regulatory partners must strive to constantly strengthen aviation safety."

(Source: FAA. Image from file)

FMI: www.faa.gov
JATR report